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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
cl?ST tl/\TIONAL BANK OF COMMERCE, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
\1. 
JEOFFREY MEACHAM, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 19287 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action originally brought by Plaintiff, First 
National Bank of Commerce, for replevin. On March 14, 1983, 
after oral arguments on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, the Honorable Philip R. Fishler of the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County issued a Memorandum 
Decision and granted Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment as 
to its First Cause of Action. The district court found that 
tne Plaintiff had the immediate right to possession of the 
subJect Ferrari automobile and that the transfer of the vehicle 
the Defendant amounted to a conversion by the Defendant. 
Tne further found that the Defendant was not a bona fide 
p1irchaser for value in21smuch 21s he f21iled to protect himself by 
who held title to 21nd liens on the vehicle. 
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The issue of damages was reserved for future determination 
by the trial 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Respondent, First National Bank of Commerce, 
requests that this Court affirm the trial court's judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's statement of the facts is incomplete and 
includes several allegations," fact," unsupported by the 
record. Therefore, Respondent provides the following 
comprehensive statement of facts: 
On May 23, 1979, Richard and Shawn Carey purchased a 1Q78 
Ferrari 308 automobile bearing identification number 26897. 
(R. 170) On January 12, 1981, the Careys obtained a lo:rn fr<Jm 
Plaintiff First National Bank of Commerce (hereinafter "Bank") 
in.the amount of $32,686.92 secured by the subject Ferrari. 
(R. 166) On April 16, 1981, the state of Louisiana issued a 
certificate of title showing Richard and Shawn Carey as owners 
of the Ferrari automobile. The Bank was shown as the first 
lien holder in the amount of $32,686.92. (R. 166-67, 170-711 
On March 11, 1981, Dr. Beuker F. Amann, Jr. (hereinafter 
"Amann") purchased the Ferrari from Richard Carey for 
$36,000.00. (R. 161, 163) To help finance the purchase, Amanr. 
borrc)Wed $25 ,ODO. 00 fr,,m Plaintiff Bank t.,wards the purcha'<e ,i 
the car. (R. 161, 167, 172-73) This ClJntract c,·,ntained a 
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o"'':llr tty agreement placing a lien on the subject Ferrari in the 
3m•.c1rt $35,429.28. (R. 167, 172-73) On April 27, 1981, 
Anann made the first payment due under his note and contract 
,11t1. the Bank. On May 20, 1981, Amann defaulted on his 
.i, l i 'Ji t l ''" to the Bank by not making the second payment when 
due. Amann did not make any further payments under the 
c0ntract and note after April 27, 1981. (R. 161, 167) 
on May 27, 1981, Plaintiff Bank sent the following 
documents to the Louisiana Department of Public Safety to 
perfect its security interest: 
( ll Application for Certificate of Title; 
(2) Notarized Bill of Sale; 
(3) Certificate of Title No. L2334105; 
(4) Notarized Chattel Mortgage; 
(5) Declaration of Insurance Statement; 
(6) Personal check for $2,534.00. (R. 167, 174) 
On or about June 10, 1981, the Department of Public Safety 
requested additional items from the Bank in connection with 
i3suing the Ferrari's title in Amann's name. Specifically, the 
Department of Public Safety requested that the rear of the 
title ue signed by Richard and Shawn Carey and that a check for 
penalty and interest be submitted in addition to the check 
1r1ginally submitted. (R. 167-68, 179) On September 8, 1981, 
the Bank received a reissued title from the Louisiana 
Jepirtment of Motor Vehicles. The Bank has retained possession 
,f the title to the Ferrari at all times since. ( R. 168) 
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Contrary to Defendant's contention, there is no evidence 
before this Court that the Bank's original lien, noted on the 
Carey title, was ever released on the records of the Louisiana 
Department of Moten Vehicles until September 8, 1981, when the 
title was reissued. 
According to Defendant Jeof frey A. Meacham, he and Richarrl 
Carey discussed Meacham's purchase of the Ferrari in June, 1981 
The agreed purchase price was $5,000.00 cash and 7,000 shares 
of U.S. Rich Hill Minerals Corporation. (R. 291; deposition of 
Meacham, pp. 10, 15) During that same month Amann deliverPrl 
the Ferrari to Mr. Carey at Mr. Amann's home in New Orleans, 
Louisiana, for the purpose of having r1r. Carey sell the car 
Meacham. (R. 162) The car was subsequently delivered to 
Meacham in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, at which time Meacham was 
shown a vehicle registration card which showed Shawn Carey, 
wife of Richard Carey, as the owner. Mr. Carey did not give 
title to the Ferrari to Defendant at that time; Moreover, 
Defendant has never received title to the automobile. (R. 
291; deposition of Meacham, pp. 10-11, 16) Meacham transp,-;rted 
the Ferrari to Salt Lake City soon thereafter. 
deposition of Meacham p. 17) 
( R. 291; 
soon after Meacham arrived in Salt Lake City with the car, 
both the Bank and Amann contacted Meacham concerning the statu, 
of the Ferrari. Amann stated that the car belonged ta him and 
that the Plaintiff had a lien on it. (R. 291; deposition of 
Meacham, pp. 6-7) Meacham was also informed of Plaintiff's 
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l10n througn a personal conversation with Plaintiff. 
of Mea:ham, pp. 26-27). 
( R. 291; 
Pla.intiff and Meacham made an agreement whereby Meacham 
e;qu:ed tc) pay ,.:iff Plaintiff's lien in return for title to the 
oiutufTil)lille. (R. 291; depositi.:in of Meacham, pp. 26-30) on 
July 20, 1981, Plaintiff sent a customer's draft to Defendant's 
ba.nk in Salt Lake City. (R. 98) Also, on July 20, 1981, 
Meacham made his first and only payment on the automobile by 
w1r1ng $5,000.00 to Amann's Account in the a.ccount of Amann. 
Account No. 30-03515, in the First City Bank of Westheimer, 
Huust·Jn, 'l:'exas. (R. 68, 71) 
After at least one more attempt to have Defendant either 
return the car or satisfy the lien, this action was filed by 
the Bank to regain its rightful possession to the automobile. 
Meacham has neither satisfied the Bank's lien on, nor paid for, 
the subject automobile. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Defendant Meacham converted the Ferrari. 
A. Murdock v. Blake controls the subject action. 
As recognized by the district court, the controlling issue 
w1tn to determining the owner of the automobile is 
:,,nversion, On March 11, 1981, Amann borrowed $25,000.00 from 
0 li1nt1ff Bank and signed a promissory note and security 
oyrecrncnt whereby Amann gave Plaintiff Bank a security interest 
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in the subject automobile. (R. 172-173) The fifth p:iragnph 
on the reverse side of this contract states: "If borrower 
fails to make any scheduled payment or defaults in any other 
obligation under this contract, holder may cause the mortgagPd 
vehicle to be seized and sold under executory or any other 
legal process, in the manner provided by law. 
Further, Utah law provides that unless otherwise agreed, "a 
secured party has on default the right to take possession of 
the collateral. § 70A-9-503, Utah Code Ann. (Repl. VJ!. 
1977) . 
Amann made his first and only payment to the Bank on April 
27, 1981. He made no further payments. Thus, on May 21, 1981, 
the day after the second payment was due, Amann defaulted on 
his loan. The Bank, as the secured party, was, therefore, 
entitled to possession of the automobile after May 20, 1981. 
Once Amann breached his contract, his right to possess or sell 
the vehicle terminated. 
In Murdock v. Blake, 26 Utah 2d 22, 484 P.2d 164 (1971), 
this Court faced a factual situation similar to the current 
case. Murdock v. Blake involved a lien creditor's execution 
upon property held subject to a security interest. The debt.Jr, 
Blake, had defaulted on an agreement with Atlantic Richfield, 
the secured creditor. After Blake's default under his security 
agreement with Atlantic Richfield, Murdock, a lien creditor, 
received a default judgment against Blake (in a matter 
unrelated to the Atlantic Richfield matter) and executed on th' 
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property secured by Atlantic Richfield's security interest. 
The Court held: 
Plake was in default at the time plaintiffs received 
the default j1dgment, Atlantic was entitled to possession 
"t ttie collateral at that time, both by virtue of the 
express provisions of the security agreement and by section 
70A-9-503. In other words, the right to possession and 
sale of the collateral passed from the debtor, Blake, to 
the secured party, Atlantic, at the time of default, and 
these are the rights to which Atlantic was entitled to be 
restored. 
Murdock, 484 P.2d at 169. 
The Court continued: 
The most important remedy available to a secured party is 
the right to take possession of the collateral following a 
debtor's default. After default, the debtor has lost his 
right of possession and sale and retains only a contingent 
right in the surplus, if any, after sale. 
* * * 
One who has possession or an immediate right to possession, 
such as a chattel mortgagee or conditional seller after 
default, may maintain an action for conversion against one 
who has exercised unauthorized acts of dominion over the 
property of another in exclusion or denial of his rights or 
inconsistent therewith. 
Murdock, 484 P.2d at 169. 
Contrary to appellant's urgings, perfection of the secured 
party's interest is not a necessary element in the conversion 
action. The status of the secured party (by virtue of the 
Security Agreement), not perfection, governs the outcome of the 
Murdock vs. Blake line of cases. The mention of perfection in 
11urdc)ck vs. Blake and other cases cited by appellant is mere 
ciJ.cta in the recitation of Licts introducing the opinion. At 
ttie time of default the only priority issue in Mqrdock and the 
-urrent case arises between the secured party and the debtor. 
Iri su'-'n a posture perfection is meaningless. 
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On May 20, 1981, upon Amann' s df'f au 1 t, thP bank had 
right to possession of the automobile. tieacham didn't rPcPiv.-
the car from Carey until 0ver one montn later; and he didn't 
make his one and only payment on the car until July 20, 1981, 
two full months after the bank received full p0ssess0ry rign•c 
The issue of priority between a secured party and a 
subsequent purchaser, so heavily reliPd on by appellant is, 
therefore, completely immaterial. At the date of Amann's 
default under the loan with the bank, the bank shifted fr,Jm u," 
position of a party with a mere security interest to that of 1 
party with full possessory rights. The ruling in tiurdock vs. 
makes it clear that in Utah the issues of perfection and 
priority under the commercial code are no longer relevan• Jnc• 
a secured party obtains possessory rights. Meacham's 
unauthorized control over the automobile which the bank, and 
only the bank, had the right to possess is conversion. 
B. The Bank had the immediate right to possession of •he 
automobile upon the debtor's default. 
Defendant Meacham now argues that Plaintiff was not 
entitled to immediate possession of the automobile upon the 
default Jf Amann the Louisiana Executory PrJcePdinq 
Law. Defendant argues that the right of p0ssession under 
Louisiana law accrues Jnly after a credit'H has gc,ne thr,-.ugh J' 
executory proceeding. 
In his answer to Plaintiff's Jrig1nal and amended 
complaints, Defendant uffered general denials to Plaintiff'• 
-'l-
J l J •ll t_ • IR. 51-53, 218-220A) "eacham offered no affidavits 
't Jr,L1sning this. And this defense is not mentioned in 
.,, IJ"t' s Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment. (R. 
I ' ..: (.I ,_' ) 
In fact, Defendant agreed in his Supplemental Memorandum in 
•,rp,3it1on to Summary Judgment that Section 70A-9-503 of the 
Utan Cude Annotated "granted to the secured party the right to 
take possession of the collateral as to the debtor" (R. 230), 
but argued that the rights of third parties were to be 
determined based on the issue of perfection. 
It is well established that Defendant cannot now raise a 
new deEense that was not before the trial court. Yost v. 
sute, 640 P. 2d 1044 (Utah, 1981). Under Rule 56, Utah Rules 
jf C1v1l Procedure, Defendant's general denials are not 
sufficient to establish the defense that Plaintiff did not have 
tne immediate right to possession. Rule 56(e) states in part: 
\/hen a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon 
tne mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his 
response, by affidavits or otherwise provided in this rule, 
must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine 
issue for trial. 
Clearly, the issue of Plaintiff's immediate right of 
)3'c331on was not raised in the trial court; defendant cannot 
raise this defense on appeal. 
:luntnel0ss, even under Louisiana law, plaintiff has the 
1°1rot '·, lf'lmed1ate possessi,.rn of the CcJllateral upon the 
c,cl t cl"fault. The Louisiana statutes dealing with 
,ut,rj [Jf.,cess, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §9:5363 and La. Civ. 
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Code Ann. Articles 2631 - 2639, requir"s Ui3t beL:,r0 a part)' 
can seize and sell coll:iteral, he must file a ['•'titian with., 
court setting forth evidence of the ·)bl iqat i·rn, c·)nfessi·Jn cf 
Judgment, and the Plaintiff's right to use executory proces; 
The court then issues a writ of seizure and sale. If, as in 
this case, the debtor waives notice and demand in the origina, 
instrument or in any other writing, the need not bP 
notified of the proceeding or receive demand f-,r payment 
the coilateral is seized. The executory prJceeding under 
Louisiana law may be completely ex parte. The filing of th• 
petition does not establish the secured party's right to go 
against the collateral; rather it merely sets forth a Judical: 
enforced procedure for taking possession of personal propert;. 
Simply stated, Louisiana is not a "self help" state. This 
distinction, h0wever, does ncJt affect the bank's right LJ 
possession upon Amann's default. Even in a UCC state, such a; 
Utah, the right to immediate possessicJn of the security upon a 
debtor's default remains unaffected if the secured party eleccc 
to repossess the security through Judicial process ratner thar 
through self help. Utah Code Annotated, §§ 70A-9-50l and 
70A-9-503 (Replacement Volume 1980). 
Under either Utah or Louisiana law, as well as under th• 
terms of the contract, plaintiff was entitled t immediate 
possession of the Ferrari upon Amann's ·Jefault. Meacham thcr, 
t CJ o k po s s e 3 s i 0 n f the :l u t i l i n '/ i _, l J t i _, n ,_-) f t n.:: l) 3 n k ' '3 
possessory right. 
converted tne Ferrari. 
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POINT II 
PJJ1ntiff's security interest was perfected under Louisiana 
,, 3 ,, j1v1 cherefore its rights are superior to Defendant's. 
A. Under Louisiana Law, Plaintiff's security interest was 
P'" f,ccted. 
In the memorandum decision of the trial court, the 
Hon0rable Judge Fishler granted summary judgment based on his 
E indings that ( l) Defendant converted the vehicle; and ( 2) that 
Defendant was not a bona fide purchaser. In passing, Judge 
F1snl€r also stated that Plaintiff's interest was unperfected 
at the time of the sale, but that Plaintiff's interest was 
;ttll superiur to Defendant's because Defendant was not a bona 
fide purchaser. Judge Fishler's statement regarding perfection 
was not essential to his decision, the decision was not based 
on perfection, and therefore the statement is dictum and not 
binding. Plaintiff will therefore briefly consider this issue 
Jf perfection. 
Appellant is correct in asserting that the determination of 
of Plaintiff's security interest is governed by the 
law of the State of Louisiana. Utah Code Annotated, section 
"70A-9-l03(2)(b)(Repl. vol., 1977) Section 32:710 of 
Vehicle Certificate of Title Law is the applicable 
law in determining the effect of perfection with regard to the 
3ank's security interest. To obtain priority against third 
,-,,ro:; ,ns, SE>ction 32:710(8) requires that every chattel mortgage 
1 in duly authenticated. Section 32:710(8) further 
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provides that the chattel mortg3ge sh3ll he 0ffective 3s toll. 
persons from the date such chattel mortg3ge is delivered to tt 
commissioner; anc the .s3me sh3ll lie su,'<'ri.,r in r3nk V:; 3n:; 
privilege or preference 3rising sub.sequently thereto. 
In the case of H3rper v. Borclen C·.-:;mp3nv, 129 s,·,. 2d 330, 
336 (Louisiana, 1961), the Louisi3n3 court held th3t the 
requirements of Section 32:710 3re "intended mer<'ly to insure 
an accur3te description of the vehicle so it c3n be 
identified." The Bank's ret3il inst3llment contr3ct included 
the year, make, series model number, body type and seri3l 
number, cert3inly enought inform3tion to s3tisfy Section 
32:710. ( R. 172) 
The evidence before this Court est3b 1 i shes th3t .;n r•ay ?7, 
1981, the Bank sent the following documents to the Louisi3nJ 
Department of Public Safety: 
(1) Application for Certificate of Title; 
(2) tlot3rized Bill .. A Sal.c; 
(3) Certificate of Title No. L2334105; 
(4) Notarized Ch3ttel Mortgage; 
(5) Declaration of Insurance St3tement; and 
(6) Person3l check for $2,534.00. 
There is no question th3t the Bank delivered the ch3ttel 
mortg3ge to the Louisian3 Dep3rtment of M··,t·.>r If.chicles •'ln May 
27, 1981. (R. 167). The Bank's c0ver letter t·-:; the Lc,uisian.-
Depa r t men t ,., f M ·:; t ·::>r Ve h i c 1 e s \Ii t h tl'H' 3 t " 3 c r: ,. 'i ch · r t cp g" i 
dated May 27, 1981 (R. 174); 3nd •n June 10, 1981, the 
- 1 ., -
Df Public Safety sent a note to the Bank 
receipt of the documents, including the chattle 
,,, .r '! ''JE:, '1nd requesting additional Lix and the signatures of 
'-''"' cHeys on their title. (R. 179) 
The lien was perfected, therefore, on May 27, 1981, or soon 
t11erea ft er, and certainly no later than June 10, 1981. section 
32:7l0(BI expressly states that the chattel mortgage is 
effective against all persons from the date such chattel 
mortgage is delivered to the commissioner; nowhere in the 
code does the chattel mortgage's effectiveness rest 
.n the commissioner's validation or final acceptance. 
AfJpellant cites Section 70A-9-302, Utah Code Ann. (Repl. 
1977 I, as providing a useful analogy in considering the 
proper fJrm of a chattel mortgage creating a valid security 
interest. According to Appellant, "a financing statement 
substantially complying with the (filing provisions) is 
effective even though it contains minor errors which are not 
seriously misleading." 9-302(9). Respondent fully agrees. 
Bank fully complied with the filing requirements under the 
LJuisiana Vehicle Certificate of Title Law with respect to the 
chattle mortgage. Admittedly the Bank neglected to obtain the 
,riy1nal owner's signature on the original title; and the check 
a penalty and interest. But Louisiana Law does not 
require such items to make a chattle mortgage 
tf 0 crive and such omissions certainly cannot be considered 
, :.er t»usly misleading. n 
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Finally, Appellant argues that since the Amann 
was returned to the Plaintiff because the C:Heys' title had M' 
been signed, and because the Carey title was still an the 
records, third pecsons could be misled as ta the ownership of 
the vehicle. Furthermore, Defendant notes that sometime after 
taking possession of the automobile, he inquired of the record, 
and found that the records showed Carey as the owner of the 
subject automobile. (R. 291; deposition of Meacham, p. 37) It 
should make no difference to Defendant whether the records of 
the Louisiana Department of Motor Vehicles showed Carey as the 
title owner or Amann as the title owner. Both titles show 
Plaintiff as having a first lien on the vehicle. (R. 170, 
180) From April 16, 1981, forward, the records (;f Louisiana 
showed Plaintiff as holding a lien on the automobile. 
Defendant did not, at the time of taking possession of the 
vehicle, make the effort to determine whether there were any 
liens at all on the vehicle. Defendant knew before making any 
payment that Plaintiff had a lien on the vehicle and therefore 
Defendant cannot now claim that Defendant's interest is 
superior to Plaintiff's. 
Finally, it should be noted that Defendant, in an eff.:)[t •: 
lead the Court to believe that there is an issue of fact 
remaining, is intentionally presenting his ,-;wn sL1tements as i'. 
they are "facts" in the record. Defendant provided n' 
affidavits supporting his claims that Plaintiff's perfection 
the chattel mortgage was defective; that the sale of the 
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,uL1m0bile by Carey to Amann took place on a date other than 
i1Hr:n LL, 1981; or that Charles Pisano was an in-house notary 
·t dHntiff. A1d there is nothing in the record to establish 
tt,Jc Plaintiff did not resubmit the application for certificate 
,f title before Defendant took possession of the car or before 
me first payment by Defendant was made on July 20, 1981. 
These facts have not been and cannot now be at issue. 
B. Texas law is inapplicable to any issue before this 
CuUrt, 
Appellant invested many pages arguing that Texas law should 
be applied to determine the priority of the parties' interest. 
Apparently, Appellant believes that the Ferrari was removed by 
Amann from Louisiana to Texas; that Plaintiff Bank knew or 
sr, .. ,uld nave known of the removal; and that Texas law should be 
3pplied to determine the priorities of the parties. Appellant 
cloims bases these hereto unalleged claims on a Transaction 
History Card (R. 82) showing an Amann address in Houston four 
months after Defendant took possession of the car. Defendant 
submitted no affidavits alleging that the subject automobile 
was taken to or kept by Amann in Texas. In fact, the chattel 
mortgage for the purchase of the automobile by Amann was signed 
in Luuisiana. Amann declared in the chattel mortgage that the 
would be kept at 145 Robert E. Lee Street, New Orleans, 
L.1u1 '1an3. (R. 172-73) Moreover, Mr. Amann, in his Affidavit 
Jated October 15, 1982, declared that on June 21, 1981, he 
·'diver0cJ the Ferrari to nr. Carey at his (Amann's) home in New 
lear1s, Louisiana. (R. 161-62) 
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By affidavit, the Respondent tds 0 sta[1li shecl t_hat ( l) tho 
car was purchased and financed in LGuisiana; I 2) that Amann 
:>greed to keep the c3r in Louisi3na; I 3) 3nJ that ,,n Jun0 21, 
1981, Carey picked up the c3r 3t Amann's hom0 in Louisiana. 
Again, f,::ir the first time, Appell.mt is n,-.w trying ho f3br 1 ci•, 
a new 3rgument baed on f:icts not previously before the Trial 
Court 3nd not now before this Court. 7he only f3ct now 
introduced by Meach3m is th:it fourt months after Me3ch3m's 
conversion of the Ferroiri, 3 Tr:insacti,-,n Hist'.H'/ Card shows ir 
address, not the 3ddress, for Amann in Houston. Th is is n')t 
sufficient evidence to show that Am3nn lived in or the 
automobile was kept in Houston, Texas. 
POINT III 
Defendant is not a Bona Fide Purchaser. 
Appellant's fin:il contention is th:it Defend3nt Me:>ch3m wis 
a bona fide purchaser for value and th3t his interest in the 
automobile is therefore protected by Louisi:ina law. Defend int 
claims that he purchased the Ferrari from Rich:ird C:irey in thE 
latter part of June, 1981, :ind th:>t it w3s n,_,t until after r,e 
h3d wired $5,000.00 to Mr. C3rey th3t he heard that Mr. Care; 
did not own the car and that the Bank had a lien on 
the automc,bile. 
on these claims, Defendant 3sserts that r1e is a iJ,:.na fide 
purchaser with rights superior t,, th,,se ,f Pl1int1ff. 
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Even under this 3rgument, Defendant's claim fails. Judge 
)f the Third District Court correctly ruled that 
f.'r"Jant \dS not a BFP under Louisiana Law. The purpose of 
t 1,'" :,J•! i 3 unoi Vehicle Certificate of Title Law is to "protect 
Lnn purchasers who have relied thereon." Ball:1rd v. 
:·1cBr•1u•', 275 So. 2d 464, 467 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973). Under 
Loui31ana Law, a purchaser is bound to check the records to 
determine who holds title and whether any liens are 
Jutstanding. Kaplan v. Associates Discount Corp., 253 La. 137, 
217 s''· 2d 177 (1968); Ballard v. McBryde, 275 so. 2d 464 (La. 
App. l973). Defendant failed to check the public records to 
decermine if any liens existed on the Ferrari until several 
montns after he took possession. Further, as the bank retained 
title to the car at all times, its security interest was 
maintained under Louisiana Law. Commercial National Bank of 
Shrevepc·rt v. Mcwilliams, 606 S.W. 2d 363 (Ark. 1980) (Applying 
Louisiana Law). Defendant was not a bona fide purchaser under 
Louisiana Law, nor is defendant a bona fide purchaser under 
Utah Law. 
The Utan court defines a bona fide purchaser is a person 
pays value and takes "without actual or constructive 
'r,,\,[<ed(1.o :.f Licts sufficient to put him on notice of the 
:)mplainant's equity." Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298 
'Jtan, 19?G) The facts befor<:> this Court do not support 
contention that he is a bona fide purchaser for the 
1 1 ,w 1 n q 3. s •_Jn s: 
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l. Defendant nad C',>nstructive n.,t1ce ,,f Plaintiff Pank •, 
lien on the car before he paid any considerati:.n for the 
automobile. Both the original Certificate :.f Title showing 
Ricnard Carey as owner and the later Certificate of Title 
showing Mr. Amann as owner ,_:;f the Ferrari w:.ted Plaintiff Banf 
as the lienholder on the car. 
It is immaterial, so far as Defendant's bona fide purchase· 
status is concerned, which of the two was in ef feet at the 
Defendant took possession of the car. In either case, the 
Defendant had constructive notice of Plaintiff's lien. Had 
Defendant checked the Louisiana Vehicle records, wnich ,,, 
admits he didn't do (R. 291; deposition ,of Meacham p. 21) he 
would have been fully aware of the Banks lien. "Notice" to 
defeat BFP status may be either actual or constructive; the 
"actual knowledge" provision of section 70A-l-2Cl of the Utan 
Code Annotated argued by appellant, does n.;t apply to bona fie' 
purchasers. 
2. Defendant had actual knowledge of the lien before 
making payment on the Automobile. Defendant states in his 
deposition that in July, 1981, he was contacted by both 
and the Bank regarding the disp'.:lsition of the aut·omobi le and i· 
tnat time learned of Bank's lien on the aut>mobile. After 
neg,_, ti at in g wit n the Bank , each am agreed t n at h" w,:. u 1 d pa Y '' '. 
the Bank's Lien and receive clear titlP to •he car. ( R. 291; 
deposition of Meacham, pp. 27-30) Pur su::i.nt t·.-) these 
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,,rea 20, 1981, to facilitate Meacham's payment of the 
'"''' and sent it co Defendant's bank. (R. 98) Obviously, 
1,i1 was aware of the Bank's lien prior to July 20, 1981. 
:' did not pay any value for the Ferrari until July 20, 
wnen he wired his one he and only payment of $5,000 to 
'Dr, Amann" ,,n July 20, 1981. There is no question but that 
was aware of the lien on the Ferrari before he 
purcnased it. 
3. Defendant claims to have purchased the automobile from 
R1cnard Carey, yet he made his payment to Dr. Amann. (R. 71) 
Defendant was therefore put on inquiry notice as to the actual 
interests of Dr. Amann and Carey in the automobile. As a 
result, Defendant was put on inquiry notice as to whether Carey 
actually owned the car. 
11e=ich01m received inquiry notice, constructive notice 01nd 
notice of the B01nk's lien before purchasing the 
auturnob1le; failed to check the public records and never 
obtained possession of the title to the vehicle. He cannot 
poss1nly be a bona fide purchaser. 
CONCLUSION 
Hunorable Philip Fishler correctly found Defendant 
!leacham t,, be guilty of conversion. The Bank was entitled to 
c,1rned1ate possession "'f the automobile upon Amann's default 
,,fl'"r w111cn Defendant Meacham took possession of the vehicle 
>1•1nsl tne interest of Plaintiff Bank. Contrary to the dicta 
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in Judge Fishler's decision the Bank did PVerything necessary 
to perfect its se2urity interest in the automobile. And even 
if the interest was unperfected, Defendant Meacham had inquir 
constructive, and actual notice of Plaintiff's lien before 
paying any value for the car, and never obtained possession 0f 
the title to the Ferrari. Defendant, therefore, cannot be a 
BFP under the laws of Louisiana or Utah and Plaintiff's rights 
in the automobile are therefore superior to Defendant's. 
As the Honorable Judge Philip Fishier did not err in 
granting Plaintiff's Motion for summary Judgment, the judgment 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this ;z /day of November, 1983. 
ame L. Chr ioo _nsen 
NIELSEN & SENIO 
1100 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 south State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for P laintiff-Respcr. 
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